The Church of the Pilgrims—now the Maronite Cathedral of Our Lady of Lebanon —in Brooklyn Heights, Brooklyn , New York designed by Richard Upjohn and built 1844–46 is generally considered the first work of Romanesque Revival architecture in the United States.  It was soon followed by a more prominent design for the Smithsonian Institution Building in Washington, . designed by James Renwick, Jr. and built 1847–51. Renwick allegedly submitted two proposals to the design competition, one Gothic and the other Romanesque in the style. The Smithsonian chose the latter, which was based on designs from German architecture books.  Several concurrent forces contributed to the popularizing of the Romanesque Revival in the United States. The first was an influx of German Immigrants in the 1840s, who brought the style of the Rundbogenstil with them.  Second, a series of works on the style were published concurrently with the earliest built examples. The first of these, Hints on Public Architecture , written by social reformer Robert Dale Owen in 1847–48, was prepared for the Building Committee of the Smithsonian Institution and prominently featured illustrations of Renwick's Smithsonian Institution Building. Owen argued that Greek Revival architecture —then the prevailing style in the United States for everything from churches to banks to private residences—was unsuitable as a national American style. He maintained that the Greek temples upon which the style was based had neither the windows, chimneys, nor stairs required by modern buildings, and that the low pitched temple roofs and tall colonnades were ill-adapted to cold northern climates. To Owen, most Greek Revival buildings thus lacked architectural truth, because they attempted to hide nineteenth century necessities behind classical temple facades.  In its place, he offered that the Romanesque style was ideal for a more flexible and economic American architecture. 
Sadako Ohki, the Japan Foundation Associate Curator of Japanese Art, received her master’s and doctoral degrees in History of Art from the University of Michigan. Ohki wrote her doctoral thesis on Ike Taiga’s calligraphy, reflecting a lifelong interest in calligraphy and ink art. She contributed an essay on Taiga to Ike Taiga and Tokuyama Gyokuran: Japanese Masters of the Brush (Philadelphia Museum of Art, 2007); on British abstract artist Rebecca Salter and her interest in Japan to Rebecca Salter: Into the Light of Things (Yale Center for British Art, 2011); and on Konoe Nobutada to the magazine Orientations (2012). Her exhibitions at the Gallery include Tea Culture of Japan: “Chanoyu” Past and Present (2009), which was accompanied by an exhibition catalogue, and, most recently, the three-part exhibition Byobu: The Grandeur of Japanese Screens (2014).
What then commends Lazerowitz’s (original) definition – the definition whereby metaphilosophy is investigation of the nature (and point) of philosophy? Two things. (1) The two ‘philosophy–of–philosophy’ construals are competing specifications of that definition. Indeed, those construals have little content until after one has a considerable idea of what philosophy is. (2) The equation of metaphilosophy and post-philosophy is narrow and tendentious; but Lazerowitz’s definition accommodates post-philosophy as a position within a more widely construed metaphilosophy. Still: Lazerowitz’s definition does require qualification, since there is a sense in which it is too broad. For ‘investigation of the nature of philosophy’ suggests that any inquiry into philosophy will count as metaphilosophical, whereas an inquiry tends to be deemed metaphilosophical only when it pertains to the essence , or very nature, of philosophy. (Such indeed is a third possible reading of the philosophy-of-philosophy construal.) Now, just what does so pertain is moot; and there is a risk of being too un accommodating. We might want to deny the title ‘metaphilosophy’ to, say, various sociological studies of philosophy, and even, perhaps, to philosophical pedagogy (that is, to the subject of how philosophy is taught). On the other hand, we are inclined to count as metaphilosophical claims about, for instance, philosophy corrupting its students or about professionalization corrupting philosophy (on these claims one may see Stewart 1995 and Anscombe 1957).